Sam Andrews

Super-Humeans (Esfeld and Deckert, 2017. A Minimalist Ontology of the Natural World. New York: Routledge) argue that the most parsimonious ontology of the natural world compatible with our best physical theories consists exclusively of particles and the distance relations between them. This paper argues by contrast that Super-Humean reduction goes insufficiently far, by showing there to be a more parsimonious ontology compatible with physics: Ultimate-Humeanism. This novel view posits an ontology consisting solely of the particles and distance relations required for the existence of a single brain. Super-Humeans impose conditions on what counts as an ontology of the natural world to avoid their view slipping into this kind of ontology, but these conditions are arbitrarily imposed and once this is exposed, Super-Humeans face a dilemma. Either they can embrace Ultimate-Humeanism as the minimal ontology of the natural world compatible with physics, or (more likely) they can rethink the methodology that got them there. Overall, this paper argues that Super Humeanism currently lacks principled motivation, outlines a framework for naturalistic ontological reductions, and exposes the consequences of unchecked adherence to a simplicity-driven methodology.

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy DOI:10.1080/0020174X.2024.2377413

Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient to defend realism solely on realist terms, I engage with the challenge on unfriendly grounds by revealing a tu quoque. Dasgupta and anti-realists face a similar challenge to that directed against realism: one that not only undermines the objection to realism by legitimising non-explanatory normativity but leaves them facing a significant dilemma.

The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Issue 4, October 2023, Pages 1305–1314, DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad052

In our theories, certain elements are proposed to play certain roles. But simply being named as the element that plays a particular role does not make that element apt to play the role. As David Lewis argues, we ought to play fair when naming our elements as just calling someone ‘Armstrong’ does not imbue them with the ability to curl heavy weights. This paper develops this constraint on theoretical elements into an explanatory principle that can serve as a criterion for metaphysical theory choice. The principle requires that there must be an explanation for how elements play their assigned roles. I show how the explanatory principle captures the force of influential arguments in the domains of laws, chances, mathematical truth, and grounding. In each case, certain views are rejected for positing elements that violate the explanatory principle. Finally, I discuss the overarching meta-philosophy that results from accepting the explanatory principle: explanatory metaphysics.

When a grounding connection is established, the question arises: is it grounded? This is the question of meta-ground and while most accept that the answer is yes – grounding connections are grounded – there is little consensus on what facts are responsible for them. This paper argues that the best answer is to ground the grounding connection in both the ground and grounded fact; a view I call Up-and-Down Meta-Ground. In support, I demonstrate how the view preserves the appealing features of various competing accounts while avoiding their pitfalls. Moreover, I argue that Up-and-Down Meta-Ground has two unique virtues, being both the only fully explanatory account of ground and the only view compatible with Humean nomic principles.